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Yes, Virginia, There Is a 
Confrontation Clause 
Tom Lininger† 
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on Myrna 
Raeder’s excellent scholarship1 concerning the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Crawford v. Washington.2  It is fitting to discuss the 
Crawford decision in New York, where much of the important 
litigation interpreting Crawford has taken place. 
One of my favorite New Yorkers was Francis Pharcellus 
Church.  We all remember Mr. Church’s famous editorial for 
the New York Sun newspaper in 1897.  Mr. Church wrote the 
piece in response to a letter from young Virginia O’Hanlon, 
whose friends told her that Santa Claus was just a myth.  Mr. 
Church emphatically rebuked the doubters:  “Virginia, your 
little friends are wrong.  They have been affected by the 
scepticism of a sceptical age . . . . Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa 
Claus.”3 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford, like Mr. 
Church’s editorial, seemed primarily concerned with rebutting 
the skeptics.  The majority opinion in Crawford sharply 
criticized prior decisions – most notably Ohio v. Roberts4 – that 
cast doubt on the primacy of the Confrontation Clause.  Just 
like Mr. Church’s editorial, the Crawford majority exposed the 
skeptics’ errors by arguing reductio ad absurdum:  if Roberts’ 
teleology were acceptable, judges could dispense with jury 
  
 † Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law (J.D., Harvard 
Law School; B.A., Yale University). 
 1 Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too:  Crawford’s 
Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005).  
Professor Raeder is arguably the nation’s foremost authority on evidentiary issues in 
prosecutions of violence against women, and her guidance has helped me tremendously 
with my own scholarship on this issue. 
 2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 3 Francis P. Church, Editorial, Is There a Santa Claus?, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 21, 
1897, available at http://www.stormfax.com/virginia.htm.  Church’s reply to Virginia is 
“without question, the best-known newspaper editorial in American history.”  Clyde 
Haberman, In This House, A Little Girl Had a Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at 
B1. 
 4 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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trials when they were confident of defendants’ guilt.5  The 
Crawford majority insisted that the Confrontation Clause is 
alive and well, and is not just a figment of defendants’ 
imaginations. 
Unfortunately, the Crawford ruling was short on 
details.  The Crawford majority spent more time disabusing 
critics of their misconceptions about the Confrontation Clause 
than announcing a clear test to replace Roberts.  The lack of 
concrete guidance in Crawford has led to inconsistent rulings 
by the lower courts.  Some courts have persisted in the 
practices decried by Crawford.6  Prosecutors are dismissing or 
losing a high number of domestic violence cases, in large part 
because no one is certain what Crawford really means.7 
In the 2005-06 term – one hundred years after the death 
of Francis Pharcellus Church – it is time for the Supreme 
Court to finish the task of vindicating the Confrontation 
Clause.  In particular, the Court should clarify the extent of 
confrontation rights in three contexts:  1) the prosecution’s use 
of verbal statements by alleged victims to responding officers; 
2) the prosecution’s use of nontestimonial hearsay; and 3) the 
prosecution’s introduction of hearsay under the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing.  Each of these topics will be discussed 
in turn below. 
I. STATEMENTS TO RESPONDING OFFICERS 
Professor Raeder is generally wary of the testimonial 
approach to confrontation, arguing that modern courts should 
not be bound by the common law in 1791.8  Her arguments are 
cogent, but I believe that in many respects the testimonial 
approach is preferable to the Roberts framework.  The 
testimonial approach is more faithful to the Framers’ intent, 
and in particular to their concerns about the trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh.9  The testimonial approach strengthens defendants’ 
  
 5 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“Dispensing with confrontation because 
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant 
is obviously guilty.”); Church, supra note 3 (“Not believe in Santa Claus!  You might as 
well not believe in fairies!”). 
 6 See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 
747, 766-67 (2005). 
 7 Id. at 750, 820 app. 1 (setting forth results of survey involving sixty 
prosecutors’ offices in California, Oregon and Washington; 76% of respondents reported 
a higher number of dismissals after Crawford). 
 8 Raeder, supra note 1, at 315-16. 
 9 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-50. 
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confrontation rights in the settings where the need for 
confrontation is most urgent.  Further, at least in theory, the 
testimonial approach makes confrontation analysis more 
predictable than under the vague Roberts test examining 
“indicia of reliability.”10 
The parameters of “testimonial hearsay” are clear in 
some contexts, but they are less clear in others.  Currently the 
most problematic issue seems to be the application of the term 
“testimonial” to alleged victims’ statements to police who have 
just arrived at the scene.  For example, when police respond to 
an emergency call at a residence where domestic violence 
seems to have occurred, and the apparent victim makes a brief 
statement to the police within a few minutes after their arrival, 
is this statement “testimonial” for purposes of Crawford? 
One possible approach would label the statement 
nontestimonial because the officers are securing the scene 
rather than “interrogating” the declarant.11  Such a 
classification may appear advantageous in that it offers a 
bright-line temporal rule (i.e. statements are admissible if 
given within a few minutes after the officers’ arrival).  But I 
believe this approach is unduly formalistic.  Accusers who 
speak to police shortly after their arrival should foresee the 
prosecutorial use of their statements.  Moreover, if police were 
able to circumvent the Crawford test merely by asking 
questions immediately after their arrival, then police might 
simply commence an informal interrogation the moment they 
meet the apparent victim, and ask all the crucial questions in 
the first few minutes.  The stopwatch has no place in 
confrontation analysis. 
  
 10 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 11 People v. Ford, No. A104115, 2004 WL 2538477, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 
10, 2004) (determining that victim’s statements in response to officers’ preliminary 
questions at scene of domestic violence were nontestimonial because officers were 
“eliciting basic facts about the nature and cause of her injuries”); People v. Magdeleno, 
No. B169360, 2004 WL 2181412, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2004) (holding that a 
statement by domestic violence victim when she first encountered police was not 
testimonial because no “structured police questioning” had occurred); People v. 
Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 873-74 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (finding that a statement by 
domestic violence victim in response to preliminary questioning by police during field 
investigation was nontestimonial); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 609-610 n.4 
(Tex. App. 2004) (stating that investigatory questioning immediately after commission 
of a crime does not constitute “interrogation” so Crawford is inapplicable). See Mungo 
v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004) (suggesting, in dictum, that assault 
victim’s “answers to the early questions, delivered in emergency circumstances to help 
the police nab [victim’s] assailant,” were not testimonial). 
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Another possible approach would be to treat all excited 
utterances as necessarily nontestimonial.  According to this 
view, a battered woman who speaks to a police officer shortly 
after the battery is so overwhelmed by the trauma of the event 
that she does not contemplate the later use of her statements 
in a criminal prosecution.  The categorical approach to excited 
utterances has attracted a number of adherents.12  I agree with 
Professor Raeder that such a rule is too drastic.13  The 
Crawford majority’s criticism of White v. Illinois14 suggests that 
the Court does not favor such liberal admission of excited 
utterances.15  In addition, a statement does not lose its 
testimonial character merely because the declarant was excited 
at the time of the statement.16  Excited declarants can foresee 
that prosecutors will use their statements.  Indeed, 
confrontation of an excited declarant may be more important 
than confrontation of a dispassionate declarant because the 
former is more likely to fabricate or exaggerate details out of 
spite toward the assailant. 
A third possible approach would consider, on a case-by-
case basis, a range of factors that distinguish testimonial from 
nontestimonial statements.  These factors might include the 
following: 1) the formality of the setting; 2) whether the 
communication was recorded; and 3) whether the officers 
  
 12 United States v. Brown, 322 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 n.4 (D. Mass. 2004) 
(expressing doubt that “Crawford would apply to spontaneous utterances”); State v. 
Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 209-11 (Me. 2004) (describing how defendant’s mother drove to 
police station and, while “sobbing and crying,” gave a statement about defendant’s 
assault on her earlier that day; the court found that the statement qualified as an 
excited utterance and was nontestimonial under Crawford analysis); State v. Wright, 
686 N.W.2d 295, 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that declarants’ “demonstrated 
emotional distress – the very quality that justified the admission of their statements as 
excited utterances – is inconsistent with a determination that they were made with a 
belief that such statements ‘would be available for use at a later trial’”) (quoting 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
(statements were nontestimonial when victim spoke spontaneously and she was 
“nervous, shaking, and crying”), aff’d, 607 S.E.2d 653 (N.C. 2005); State v. Banks, No. 
03AP-1286, 2004 WL 2809070, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2004) (Crawford does not 
apply to excited utterances), appeal denied, 825 N.E.2d 624, and 830 N.E.2d 348 (Ohio 
2005); Rivera v. State, No. 04-03-00830-CR, 2004 WL 3015165, at *1-2 (Tex. App. Dec. 
30, 2004) (mem.) (excited utterance to responding officers was not testimonial). 
 13 Raeder, supra note 1, at 335. 
 14 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 15 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
 16 Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“In our 
view, the findings necessary to support a conclusion that a statement was an excited 
utterance do not conflict with those that are necessary to support a conclusion that it 
was testimonial . . . . [T]he statement does not lose its character as a testimonial 
statement merely because the declarant was excited at the time it was made.”). 
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announced they had a particular suspect in mind.17  Professor 
Raeder seems to advocate a case-by-case approach, and I agree 
with her that the multifactor approach is preferable to the two 
categorical approaches discussed above.18 On the other hand, 
the multifactor standard is unpredictable, and results could 
vary from court to court.  Two courts faced with identical facts 
might ascribe different significance to the same fact, as in the 
Roberts era.19 
Perhaps a fourth approach deserves consideration.  
Statements to police officers could be treated as presumptively 
testimonial, so long as the declarant knew she was speaking 
with a police officer.  The presumption could be rebutted if the 
prosecution could make a strong showing that the 
characteristics of nontestimonial statements predominated 
over the characteristics of testimonial statements.  This 
approach might combine the advantages of a multifactor test 
with the greater predictability of a categorical rule.  Critics 
might complain that the presumption would result in the loss 
of many victims’ statements, but exclusion need not necessarily 
result.  The classification of evidence as testimonial would 
simply require that the prosecution afford the accused an 
opportunity for confrontation, possibly at a pretrial hearing or 
deposition. 
II. NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY 
I agree with Professor Raeder that one of Crawford’s 
greatest shortcomings is its failure to specify confrontation 
requirements for nontestimonial hearsay.20  Many lower courts 
have avoided the Crawford test by classifying the hearsay at 
issue as nontestimonial.  Indeed, in the nine months between 
the date of the Crawford ruling and the end of 2004, lower 
courts issued hundreds of rulings interpreting Crawford, and 
approximately one-third of the rulings that reached the merits 
determined that the evidence at issue was nontestimonial.21  
Those courts deeming hearsay to be nontestimonial have 
generally applied Roberts and its progeny – a great irony given 
  
 17 See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856-57 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(stressing formality and setting, among other factors), review granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 
2004). 
 18 Raeder, supra note 1, at 331. 
 19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
 20 Raeder, supra note 1, at 316-17. 
 21 Lininger, supra note 6, at 766-67. 
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the Crawford majority’s vehement criticism of Roberts.  
Because the opinions following Roberts, especially Inadi and 
White,22 have rendered the confrontation analysis perfunctory 
for firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions, the application of the 
Roberts test is tantamount to applying no confrontation test at 
all. 
What would be a better test for nontestimonial hearsay?  
One attractive alternative is the approach taken by Oregon 
courts.  Even before Crawford, the Oregon Supreme Court 
recognized the danger in dispensing with confrontation 
analysis for hearsay fitting within a firmly-rooted exception.  
In Oregon v. Moore,23 the court declined to follow Inadi, White, 
and the other progeny of Roberts that rendered confrontational 
analysis co-extensive with statutory hearsay law.  The Oregon 
Supreme Court required the prosecution to demonstrate the 
unavailability of the declarant or to produce the declarant for 
cross-examination, whether or not the prosecution invoked a 
firmly-rooted hearsay exception.24 This requirement helps to 
avoid the gamesmanship of the pre-Crawford era, when 
prosecutors called police to recount victims’ hearsay statements 
even when the victims were available to testify.25 
If Roberts continues to supply the confrontation test for 
nontestimonial hearsay, police will likely modify their practices 
so that they elicit statements in settings that do not trigger the 
strictures of Crawford.  The efficacy of defendants’ 
confrontation will then depend on officers’ skill in avoiding the 
label “testimonial.”26  The protection of the Sixth Amendment 
should not be vulnerable to such manipulation.  It is time for 
the Supreme Court to close the gap between confrontation 
rights for testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay. 
  
 22 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (finding that government 
may offer co-conspirator’s statement without showing unavailability of declarant); 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (holding that Confrontation Clause does not 
require proof of unavailability when government offers hearsay under exceptions for 
excited spontaneous declarations and for statements made to obtain medical 
treatment). 
 23 49 P.3d 785 (Or. 2002). 
 24 Id. at 792. 
 25 See, e.g., Beach v. State, 816 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that 
the pre-Crawford trial court had allowed the prosecution to offer hearsay statements 
against the accused even though the declarant was available to testify), abrogated by 
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
 26 See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (expressing concern 
that officers will be able to manipulate factors that distinguish testimonial from 
nontestimonial hearsay). 
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III. FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 
In the wake of Crawford, some prosecutors are 
attempting to avoid confrontation requirements entirely by 
invoking the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  This 
doctrine extinguishes the confrontation rights of a party who 
has wrongfully procured the absence of the hearsay declarant.27  
Dicta in Crawford expressly approved the forfeiture doctrine.28  
Adam Krischer of the American Prosecutors Research Institute 
has gone so far as to argue that “domestic violence almost 
always involves forfeiture.”29 
I support the forfeiture doctrine as a general matter, but 
I worry that it will become too expansive after Crawford.  
Professor Raeder has suggested some reasonable boundaries 
for the doctrine:  it should only apply when the opponent 
actually intended to procure the declarant’s unavailability, or 
when the opponent killed the declarant.30  Mr. Krischer, 
however, would transform the forfeiture doctrine into a silver 
bullet that would slay Crawford in virtually any domestic 
violence prosecution.  Domestic violence is coercive, to be sure, 
but not every assault carries with it the threat of reprisals if 
the victim cooperates with law enforcement.  If courts were to 
presume such tampering in every domestic violence case, the 
forfeiture exception would swallow the rule of confrontation. 
As prosecutors rely increasingly on the forfeiture 
doctrine in the aftermath of Crawford, important questions 
remain to be answered.  What standard of proof should apply?31  
Should all categories of statements by the victim be admissible 
against the wrongdoer, or only those that relate to the 
  
 27 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 28 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
 29 Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid, 
PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 14, available at 38-DEC PROSC 14 (Westlaw). 
 30 Raeder, supra note 1, at 355. 
 31 Most courts have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard when 
judging whether the proponent has made the predicate showing to invoke the doctrine 
of forfeiture of wrongdoing.  See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 
1280 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982); 
Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 
624, 629 (10th Cir. 1980); People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *11 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004); State v. Henry, 820 A.2d 1076, 1087 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); 
State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004); United States v. Melendez, No. CRIM. 
96-0023, 1998 WL 737994, at *3 (D.P.R. Oct. 15, 1998); United States v. Rivera, 292 F. 
Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2003).   
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wrongdoing? What does it mean for a party to “acquiesce” in 
wrongdoing as provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6)?  
The lower courts are beginning to hear a number of forfeiture 
arguments after Crawford, but guidance from the Supreme 
Court would be helpful to avoid a patchwork of conflicting 
opinions.32  Prosecutors and courts should resist the temptation 
to treat the forfeiture doctrine as a panacea for all the 
difficulties created by Crawford. 
IV. CONCLUSION:  LESS CANT, MORE KANT 
Francis Pharcellus Church lived by a simple motto: 
“Endeavor to clear your mind of cant.”33 The lower courts 
interpreting Crawford would do well to follow this adage.  
While courts have generally acknowledged that Crawford 
requires greater respect for confrontation rights, some courts 
still cling to the teleological conception of confrontation.  
Notwithstanding their lip service to Crawford, these courts 
seem to believe that confrontation is merely a means to the end 
of ensuring the reliability of evidence, and that confrontation 
rights must occasionally give way to considerations of 
expediency. 
A Kantian perspective would be more appropriate.  
Confrontation is not a means to an end, but an end in itself.  
The government must respect the defendant’s autonomy in 
determining whether to confront accusers, even when the 
utility of such confrontation may appear negligible in a 
particular case. 
The Supreme Court should clarify that when it said 
confrontation, it meant confrontation.  In a follow-up ruling to 
Crawford, the Supreme Court should spell out what the 
Confrontation Clause requires in the settings where lower 
courts have ruled inconsistently.  Prosecutors should focus 
  
 32 Compare State v. Ivy, No. W2003-00786-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL 3021146, at 
*14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (murder of declarant did not justify finding of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing where prosecutor could not show intent to prevent victim 
from testifying), with People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847-48 (Ct. App. 2004), 
review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the defendant forfeited 
confrontation rights by murdering declarant, even where government could not show 
intent to prevent declarant from testifying).   
 33 THE PEOPLE’S ALMANAC 1358 (David Wallechinsky & Irving Wallace eds., 
1975).  Webster’s offers this definition for the term “cant”:  “The use of religious 
phraseology without understanding or sincerity; empty, solemn speech, implying what 
is not felt; hypocrisy.”  Webster Dictionary, http://www.webster-
dictionary.net/d.aspx?w=cant (last visited Oct. 12, 2005). 
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their attention on facilitating the confrontation that Crawford 
demands, rather than disputing the need for confrontation.34 
  
 34 For strategies to allow more confrontation of hearsay declarants, see 
Lininger, supra note 6, at 783-813.  See also Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. 
Washington:  Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 511, 591-614 (2005) (suggesting various strategies to facilitate confrontation 
required by Crawford, including pretrial confrontation of hearsay declarants). 
